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I. INTRODUCTION

At the 1998 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Rome Conference)
States could not agree over a definition of the "crime of aggression."' As

* LL.B. (UQAM), LL.M. (NUIG). Charg6 de cours at the Universite du Quebec b
Montrdal. Doctoral Candidate, Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland,
Galway. Recipient of the Government of Ireland Research Scholarship in the Humanities and Social
Sciences 2001-2004. Assistant Editor, Criminal Law Forum. The author would like to thank
Professor William A. Schabas for his comments on a previous draft of this Article.
1. Three main issues pertaining to the crime of aggression were being discussed, namely
whether the crime should be included in the ICC Statute, what would be the role of the U.N.
Security Council in relation to the adjudication of this crime by the ICC, and finally how would the
crime be defined. See Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdictionof the
Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES,
NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 81-83 (Roy Lee ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE]; Andreas Zimmermann, Article 5: Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 104 (Otto
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the Rome Conference was winding down, the Bureau of the Committee of
Whole proposed that the "crime of aggression" could be included in the
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) only if generally
accepted provisions could be developed by interested delegations by 13
July, that is, four days before the end.2 The Movement of Non-Aligned
Countries proposed that the Preparatory commission for the International
Criminal Court (PrepCom) be given the task of defining the "crime of
aggression," and that the Court would not exercise its jurisdiction over this
crime until such a definition be adopted. This was accepted as
compromise to move past the deadlock. 4
The "crime of aggression" was included in article 5(1) of the ICC
Statute but not defined.5 Article 5(2) imposes three conditions in order for
the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over the "crime of aggression." First,
a provision must be adopted defining the crime and setting out the
conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect
to this crime. Second, the provision must be consistent with the relevant
provisions of the U.N. Charter. Third, this provision must be adopted in
accordance with articles 121 and 123 of the ICC Statute.6 Resolution F of

Triffiterer ed., 1999) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE]; Pietro Gargiulo, The
ControversialRelationshipBetween the InternationalCriminalCourtand the Security Council, in
ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT vol. I, at 91-92 (Flavia
Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 1999); Giorgio Gaja, The Long Journey Towards Repressing
Aggression, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT vol. I, at 436
(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002); Philippe Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Reaching Agreement at
the Rome Conference, in id. at 71; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1I/L.37, Proposal Submitted by
Algeria, Bahrain, Islamic Republic ofIran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen;
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.56/Corr.1, Proposal Submitted by Algeria, Bahrain, Islamic
Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syrian Arab Republic, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen; U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/L.38, Proposal Submitted by Armenia; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.39,
Proposal Submitted by Cameroon, Article 5, "Crime of Aggression."
2. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/C. 1I/L.59, Bureau Proposal, at 1.It specified that ifno generally
accepted definition was presented, the Bureau would propose that this crime be reflected in some
other manner such as a Protocol or a review conference.
3. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.75, Amendments Submitted by the Movement of NonAligned Countries to the Bureau Proposal (A/CONF. 183/C. 1/L.59).
4. Silvia A. Femndez de Gurmendi, The Working Groupon Aggression at the Preparatory
Commissionfor the InternationalCriminal Court,25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 589 (2001-2002).
5. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, Rome Statute ofthe InternationalCriminalCourt, art. 5(1)
[hereinafter ICC Statute].
6. Id. art 5(2):
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the Final Act of the Rome Conference 7 established the PrepCom to ensure
that the ICC would become operational without undue delay. The
PrepCom's specific mandate included the preparation of proposals for a
provision on aggression, including the definition and elements of this
crime, as well, as the conditions under which the ICC shall exercise its
jurisdiction. Such proposals will be submitted to the Assembly of States
Parties [ASP] at a Review Conference, with a view to arriving at an
acceptable provision on the "crime of aggression" for inclusion in the ICC
Statute.'
By the end of its last session in July 2002, the PrepCom had not
produced a final provision of the "crime of aggression" meeting the
criteria of article 5(2) of the ICC Statute. However, the Coordinator of the
PrepCom's Working Group on the Crime of Aggression had come up with
a discussion paper that addressed these issues.9
The ASP to the ICC Statute met for the first time in September 2002
and adopted a resolution on the continuity of the work in respect to the
"crime of aggression." A new Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression (SWGCA) open to all Member States of the United Nations,
as well as members of specialized agencies and of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, was established for the purpose of elaborating
proposals for a provision on aggression for the ASP's consideration at a
Review Conference on the ICC Statute.'°
The SWGCA has attempted to build on the progress made during the
PrepCom. It held its first informal inter-sessional meeting in July 2004 at
the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson

The Court shall exercisejurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision
is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting
out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect
to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations.
7. U.N. Doc. A/CONFR.183/10 (1998), Final Act of the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Annex I; see Resolutions
adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Resolution F.
8. Id. 7.
9. International Criminal Court, Discussion Paperon the Definition and Elements of the
Crime of Aggression, at 3, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2 (2002) [hereinafter Coordinator's
Discussion Paper] (prepared by the Coordinator of the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression,
Proposals for a Provision on the Crime of Aggression).
10. Assembly of State Parties, Continuity of Work in Respect of the Crime of Aggression,
at 328, PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2 (2002).
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School, at Princeton University and discussed a number of substantive and
procedural issues relating to the "crime of aggression."' 1
At its second informal inter-sessional meeting at Princeton University
in June 2005 the SWGCA discussed the definition of the "crime of
aggression" and the conditions under which the Court shall exercise
jurisdiction, 12 as well as the application to this crime of the provisions in
the ICC statute pertaining to the investigation and prosecution of a case by
the Prosecutor and those pertaining to national security information. 3 The
SWGCA also revisited some of the issues it had discussed the previous
year. It examined whether it was possible for a state to opt out of the
Court's jurisdiction over the "crime of aggression,"14 and whether specific
articles of the ICC Statute had to be retained, excluded, or adapted in
relation to this crime, among which was article 25(3).5
Article 25 of the ICC Statute refers to individual criminal responsibility
in general, and paragraph three thereof deals with specific means for
attributing criminal responsibility. Subparagraph (a) of article 25(3) states
that a person is criminally responsible for committing a crime, whether as6
an individual, jointly with another person, or through another person.'
Subparagraph (b) punishes the ordering, soliciting, or inducing the

11. ICC-ASP/3/SWGCA/INF. 1 (2004). Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, held at the Liechtenstein Institute on SelfDetermination, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, New Jersey, United States, from
21 to 23 June 2004. The issues discussed included the jurisdiction rationetemporis of the ICC, the
incorporation and placement of the provisions on the crime of aggression, issues relating to
complementarity and admissibility, the principle of ne bis in idem in relation to the crime of
aggression, and general principles of criminal law contained in articles 25(3), 28, 30, 31, and 33
of the ICC Statute.
12. ICC-ASP/4/SWGCA/INF. 1 (2005), Information Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, held at the Liechtenstein Institute on SelfDetermination, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, New Jersey, United States, from
13 to 15 June 2005,
56-86 [hereinafter SWGCA Report].
13. Id. 52-55.
14. Id. 5-17.
15. Id.
18-51. These included article 25(3) (individual participation in a crime, article 28
(command responsibility), article 30 (the mental element), and article 33 (the defense of superior
orders).
16. ICC Statute, supranote 5, art. 25(3)(a). The first form of perpetration refers to the direct
or immediate perpetration of a crime by an individual. The second relates to situations of coperpetration, whereby the functional tasks of a crime are divided between at least two perpetrators,
who have in principle a common plan or agreement to this effect. The third pertains to the
"perpetration of a crime by means," whereby an indirect (the author of the crime) is used as an
instrument or tool by an indirect perpetrator or mastermind. See Kai Ambos, Article 25: Individual
CriminalResponsibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 1, at 478-79.
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commission of a crime.' 7 Subparagraph (c) relates to criminal
responsibility for aiding, abetting, or otherwise assisting in the commission
of a crime, for the purpose of facilitating its commission. 8 An individual
can be held criminally responsible under subparagraph (d) for his or her
contribution to the commission or attempted commission of a crime in any
other way than those mentioned above, that is, when committed by a group
of persons acting with a common plan or purpose. 9 Such a contribution
must be made either with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or
criminal purpose of the group, or in the knowledge of the intention of the
group to commit the crime.2 ° Subparagraph (e) deals with the direct and
public incitement of genocide, 2' whereas subparagraph (f) relates to the
attempted commission of a crime.22
The debate as to whether article 25(3) of the ICC Statute should be
retained, excluded, or adapted in relation to the "crime of aggression"
stems from the discussion paper proposed by the coordinator of the
PrepCom's Working Group on the crime of aggression. In it the
Coordinator based her definition of the "crime of aggression" on a formula
derived from the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg (IMT), 23 which criminalized the planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of a war of aggression under the rubric of "crimes
against peace. 24 The Coordinator's discussion paper proposed that article
25(3) of the ICC Statute be not applicable to the "crime of aggression. 25
This has given the SWGCA the impression that article 25(3) of the ICC
Statute and "crimes against peace" are mutually exclusive.
This Article challenges this assumption and focuses on whether article
25(3) of the ICC Statute is compatible with the "crime of aggression."
17. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 25(3)(b). Technically speaking, a person who orders a
crime is not merely an accomplice, but a perpetrator by means. Soliciting a crime relates to when
a person commands, encourages, requests, or incites another person to commit the crime in
question. The concept of inducing a crime envelops that of soliciting, because it relates to "any
conduct which causes or leads another person to commit a crime, including soliciting that person."
See Ambos, supranote 16, at 480-81.
18. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 25(3)(c). This is the lowest form of complicity and covers
any act which contributes to commission or attempted commission of a crime. See Ambos, supra
note 16, at 481-83.
19. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 25(3)(d).
20. Id. art. 25(3)(d)(i), (ii).
21. Id. art. 25(3)(e).
22. Id. art. 25(3)(f).
23. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annexed to the London Agreement, Aug.
8, 1945, 8 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter].
24. Id. art. 6(a).
25. Coordinator's Discussion Paper, supra note 9, § I, 3.
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Evidently the "crime of aggression" has not been defined in final terms.
The SWGCA acknowledged that the jurisprudence of the IMT and of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE)26 is more relevant
to this question than the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which do not
deal with the "crime of aggression."27
"Crimes against peace" is the legal predecessor of the modem "crime
of aggression" and the interpretation given to the former is essential when
framing the latter. In this Article many inferences are drawn based on the
IMT Charter, the IMTFE Charter and Allied Control Council Law No. 1028
as well as the resulting case law formt he adjudication of "crimes against
peace."
II. THE PREPCOM'S WORKING GROUP ON THE
CRIME OF AGGRESSION

As indicated above, the discussion paper proposed by the Coordinator
of the PrepCom's Working Group on the Crime of Aggression attributed
individual criminal responsibility for the "crime of aggression" to a person
who "intentionally and knowingly orders or participates actively in the
planning, preparation, initiation, or execution of an act of aggression."29
The discussion paper also stated that article 25(3) of the ICC Statute is
not applicable to the "crime of aggression." This is possibly understood by
the fact that the general provisions contained in the ICC Statute would be
overridden by the specific formula adopted (planning, preparation,
initiation, or execution), which is derived from the IMT Charter. In actual
fact, article 25(3) would not be completely excluded because it would be
relied upon when interpreting the terms "orders or participates" used in the
discussion paper.

26. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, TIAS No. 1589 [hereinafter IMTFE
Charter].
27. SWGCA Report, supra note 12, 26.
28. Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, in the Official Gazette of the Control Council
for Germany, No. 3, Berlin, Jan. 31, 1946, at 50-55 [hereinafter Control Council Law No. 10].
29. Coordinator's Discussion Paper, supra note 9, § I, 1; see Roger S. Clark, Rethinking
Aggression as a Crimeand FormulatingIts Elements: The Final Work-Productof the Preparatory
Commissionfor the InternationalCriminal Court, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 859-90 (2002); Matthias
Schuster, The Rome Statute and the Crime ofAggression: A GordianKnot in Search of a Sword,
14 CRIM. L.F. 1-57 (2003).
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The SWGCA recognized this inconsistency and stated that if it were to
follow the Coordinator's discussion paper it would have to refine the
definition of aggression contained therein by aligning the general
principles of criminal with other provisions of the ICC Statute.3"
The SWGCA also considered departing from the Coordinator's
discussion paper altogether and saw two options for doing so. Although
the SWGCA examined them separately these two options can in fact be
combined. 3 Under the first option the SWGCA could elaborate a concise
definition of aggression, leaving the general principles to be covered by
the ICC Statute, in particular article 25.32 Under the second option, the
SWGCA could insert a new subparagraph "e) bis" to clarify the specific
relationship between the "crime of aggression" as a leadership crime and
article 25(3) of the ICC Statute.33
The Coordinator's discussion paper qualified the "crime of aggression"
as a leadership crime because it attributed criminal responsibility only to
individuals that were "in a position to effectively exercise control over or
direct the political or military action of a State. '34 This followed a proposal
by Belgium, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and Thailand, which took the view
that "the crime of aggression is a leadership crime which may only be
committed by persons who have effective control of the State and military
apparatus on a policy level" according to the jurisprudence of the IMT and
the Allied Tribunals established under Control Council Law No. 10.

30. SWGCA Report, supra note 12, 24(b).
31. Theoretically, the only situation in the second approach in which the exclusion of article
25(3) could be justified is if the future definition of the act of aggression would require a prior
determination for it to exist. If such a determination were not made, then the act of aggression
would not exist and the criminalization of this act through the "crime of aggression" would not be
possible. See id. 23.
32. Id. I 24(a).
33. Id. T$ 24(c), 30, 32; id.Annex I, Proposals A & B.
34. Coordinator's Discussion Paper, supra note 9, § I, 1:
For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a "crime of aggression"
when, being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the
political or military action of a State, that person intentionally and knowingly
orders or participates actively in the planning, preparation, initiation or execution
of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a
flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
35. U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2002/WGCA/DP.5, Incorporating the Crime of Aggression as a
Leadership Crime Into the Definition; Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, in Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A151/10 (1996). 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, 89, 1996, art. 16: "An individual who, as leader or
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Some of the States with constitutional monarchies sponsored this proposal
in order to ensure that heads of state that did not exercise any real
executive governmental power would be spared from a prosecution for the
"crime of aggression."
The IMT stated that its Charter codified and contributed to customary
international law.36 Two observations must be made when the
Coordinator's discussion paper is compared with the IMT Charter,
specifically article 6 in fine, which stated that: "leaders, organizers,
instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution
of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such
plan."37 The first observation is that the "crime of aggression" is a
leadership crime given the reference in the IMT Charter to leaders,
organizers, and instigators; this specific topic is discussed in further detail
below. The second observation is that the definition in the Coordinator's
discussion paper was based on an incomplete formulation of the IMT
Charter because it only criminalized the planning, preparation, initiation,
and execution of an act of aggression but did not refer to accomplices or
those participating in a common plan or conspiracy to commit aggression.
The Coordinator's discussion paper creates the problem whereby an
accomplice in the "crime of aggression" could not be prosecuted because
both article 6 in fine of the IiMT Charter and article 25(3) of the ICC
Statute were excluded.38

organizer, actively participates in or orders the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of
aggression committed by a State shall be responsible for a crime of aggression."
36. Judicial Decisions: International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and
Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 216 (1947) [hereinafter IMT Judgment]. The IMT stated that its
Charter was an expression of international law existing at the time of its creation as well as a
contribution to international law. For commentaries on the IMT Judgment, see George Finch, The
Nuremberg Trial and InternationalLaw, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 20 (1947); Quincy Wright, The Law
of the Nuremberg Trial,41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 (1947); Quincy Wright, Legal Positivism and the
Nuremberg Judgment, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 405 (1948); Hans Ehard, The Nuremberg TrialAgainst
the Major War CriminalsandInternationalLaw,43 AM. J. INT'LL. 223 (1949); Hans Kelsen, Will
the Judgment in the Nuremberg TrialConstitute a Precedentin InternationalLaw?, 1 INT'L L.Q.
153 (1947); Benjamin B. Ferencz, InternationalCriminalCourts: The Legacy ofNuremberg, 10
PACE INT'L L. REV. 209 (1998).
37. IMT Charter, supra note 23, art. 6 in fine; IMTFE Charter, supra note 26, art. 5(c);
Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 28, art. 11(1)(c).
38. Coordinator's Discussion Paper, supra note 9, § I, 1, 3. See William A. Schabas, The
Unfinished WorkofDefiningAggression:How Many Times Must the CannonballsFly,Before They
are ForeverBanned?, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, LEGAL AND POLICY

ISSUES 123-41 (Dominic McGoldrick et al. eds., 2004).
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The SWGCA has taken this problem into account and noted in its
report the potential risk of excluding a group of perpetrators.39 It also
stated that before definitely excluding article 25(3) of the ICC Statute, it
would be preferable to verify whether its provisions matched each specific
situation.4"
Therefore the question that arises is whether "crimes against peace,"
the legal predecessor of the "crime of aggression," is compatible with the
means of participation in a crime under article 25(3) of the ICC Statute.
There was a tendency by participants of the SWGCA to comment at
first instance on article 25(3) subparagraphs (a) to (e), which is indicated
above relate to the direct and indirect commission of a crime, the
complicity in a crime, the commission of a crime by virtue of a common
plan or purpose, and the incitement of genocide. The participants
commented at a later instance on subparagraph (f), which deals with the
attempted commission of a crime. The rationale expressed by some
participants was that the "crime of aggression" presupposed the existence
of a completed collective act of aggression, whereas the attempt to commit
this crime did not require the completion of the act of aggression.4 The
report of the SWGCA reflects this split approach and addresses the attempt
to commit the "crime of aggression" separately from the other forms
through which the crimes can be committed.42
The case law analysis of the substance of "crimes against peace" in the
following section shall serve as the basis for evaluating its compatibility
of article 25(3) subparagraphs (a) to (d) of the ICC Statute. Subparagraph
(e) relating to incitement and subparagraph (f) relating to attempt are dealt
with in later sections of this Article.
III. THE DEFINITION OF "CRIMES AGAINST PEACE"

A. Points of Overlap
The IMTFE in the case of United States v. Araki Sadao,43 stated that
five separate crimes appeared under the heading of "crimes against peace."

39. SWGCA Report, supra note 12, 9 23.
40. Id.
41. Id. 938.
42. Id. 1 18. Article 25(3) subparagraphs (a) to (e) of the ICC Statute are dealt with together.
See id.
18-43. Whereas subparagraph (f) is dealt with in another section. Id. 33-43.
43. THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRiAL (R.J. Pitchard & S.N. Zaide eds., 1981) vols. 20 & 21
[hereinafter IMTFE Judgment].
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The first four were the planning, preparing, initiating, and waging a war
of aggression or a war in "violation of international law, agreements,
treaties, or assurances." The fifth crime was the participation in either a
conspiracy or a common plan to commit "crimes against peace."
It is evident that there is some degree of overlap between some of these
five crimes. The first point of overlap is between the participation in a
"common plan" and the "planning" of aggression. For example, the IMT
in United States v. Hermann Wilhelm Goering45 decided to examine the
questions of the existence of a common plan and the question of planning
aggressive war together because it considered them to be in substance the
same and because the Prosecution introduced the same evidence to support
these counts.46
The lIMTFE also acknowledged such an overlap and decided that for
the defendants that were found guilty of conspiracy it was not necessary
for it to consider nor to enter convictions in relation to counts referring to
planning and preparing "crimes against peace," even though it did not
question the validity of these charges.47 Although Judges R6ling and
Bernard dissented from the decision rendered by the majority of the
IMTFE, they each conceded that planning and preparing aggressive war
overlapped with the conspiracy count.4 8

44. Id.vol. 20, at 48447.
45. IMT Judgment, supra note 36.
46. Id.at 222.
47. See IMTFE Judgment, supra note 43, at 48448 (specifically, counts 6 to 17 inclusive).
Judge Jaranilla in his concurring opinion is the only Judge who disagreed with the IMTFE's view,
however, he seems to have based his opinion to some extent on a misinterpretation of the IMTFE's
findings. He found that the IMTFE Judgment implied that a defendant was guilty of conspiracy in
the waging of a war of aggression was necessarily guilty of planning, preparing, and initiating it.
He believed this premise to be correct on the condition that this defendant had in fact planned,
prepared, initiated, and waged a war. However, he argued that this premise did not work in the case
where a defendant was guilty of only planning, preparing, and initiating, but not guilty of waging
an aggressive war. Judge Jaranilla is incorrect in his analysis of the issue of conspiracy because the
IMTFE only examined the question of conspiracy in relation to planning and preparing, and not
with regards to initiating and waging a war of aggression. Also, Judge Jaranilla incorrectly
construed the IMTFE's view in that initiating and waging a war of aggression did not merely
overlap but in fact were synonymous. Consequently, he stated that these terms did not mean the
same thing. He found that waging could include initiating, but not necessarily in all circumstances.
Also, initiating could be a form of waging, but the latter is much wider a notion. Moreover, a
defendant could take part in initiating or waging a war of aggression without having ever
participated in its planning or preparation. See id.vol. 21, at 8-9 (Jaranilla, J., concurring).
48. Judge R61ing stated that it was not necessary to decide in detail whether someone planned
or prepared an aggressive war, or conspired in the accomplishment of its planning, preparation,
initiation, and waging. See Separate Opinion of the Member for the Netherlands, Judge Bernard
Victor R6ling, in id.vol. 21, at 51; Judge Bernard, in his dissenting opinion, admitted that
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Judge Anderson, concurring in United States v. Aifried Felix Alwyn
Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach (Krupp Case),4 9 saw this overlap
somewhat differently. He considered that the participation in a
"conspiracy" to commit "crimes against peace" encompassed the
"common plan."5 Also, based on his reading of the IMT Judgment he
stated that: "the offence of planning, preparation, and initiation of
aggressive wars is, in practical effect, the same as the conspiracy."'"
However, the prosecution in United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb (High
Command Case)52 challenged Judge Anderson's view. It did not consider
that the offence of conspiracy was not identical to the offence of planning,
preparing, and initiating aggression, and that waging aggression was a
distinct offence.53 It correctly pointed out that despite the fact that the IMT
considered the two crimes as essentially the same, it actually treated them
differently and came to different conclusions when determining the
individual guilt of defendants under the two crimes charged.54 Judge
Anderson's position is untenable when considering the case of the
defendants Frick and Funk who were acquitted by the IMT on the charge
of conspiracy but nevertheless convicted on the charge of planning,
preparing, initiating, and waging aggressive war.55 The Prosecution
acknowledged that in practical terms the distinction drawn by the IMT

conspiracy overlapped with planning and preparing aggressive war according to the IMTFE,
nevertheless he stressed that these offences were distinct. He considered planning and preparing
as more serious matters than mere conspiracy and wished that the IMTFE had taken the former
crimes, if established, into consideration as the basis for a conviction. See Dissenting Opinion of
the Member from France, Judge Henri Bernard, in id. vol. 21, at 5.
49. United States v. Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach et al., in 9 TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG TRIBUNALS, 1947-1948, at 1 (U.S. Government
Printing Office 1950) [hereinafter TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS].
50. Id.at 420 (Anderson, J., concurring opinion). Judge Anderson considered the most
substantial aspect of conspiracy to be the association or acting in concert for the purpose of
formulating or executing a common plan involving criminal ends.
51. Id. at443.
52. United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb (High Command Case), in 10 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 49, at 3.
53. Id. at 330-31. Judge Anderson came to such a conclusion based on the fact the IMT had
acquitted Doenitz of conspiracy to aggressive wars and of planning, preparing, and initiating wars
of aggression, but convicted him of waging aggressive wars. However, this was solely based on the
fact that he had ascended to a policy level. See infra text accompanying note 130.
54. United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb (High Command Case), in 10 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 49, at 331-32."Eight defendants were convicted under count one, charge
for conspiracy, and 14 were acquitted. Twelve defendants were convicted under count two and only
four were acquitted; six were not charged under count two."
55. Id. at 331-32. The IMT came to similar findings regarding Seyss-Inquart. See IMT
Judgment, supra note 36, at 291-93, 296-98, 318-21.
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between "conspiracy," and "planning, preparing, initiating, and waging"
was academic because most of the defendants had attended one or more of
the Hitler conferences, except for Funk and Frick.56 The Tribunal in the
High Command Case took a practical approach instead and did not dwell
on these subtleties. It dismissed the conspiracy count on the grounds that
the Prosecution did not introduce any new evidence that was not
admissible already under the count of "crimes against peace."57
The IiMTFE also found another point of overlap in that "initiating,"
defined as the commencing of hostilities, included the crime of "waging"
aggressive war. After some individuals initiate an aggressive war, others
may participate therein as to become guilty of waging the war. Thus, it had
no reason to convict persons on the counts of initiating as well as waging
aggressive war.5 8 Judge Rling, in his dissenting opinion, acknowledged
this overlap as well.59
This section highlights a portion of the Second World War case law
that is often overlooked by the literature when examining the definition of
"crimes against peace." It demonstrates that there are two points of overlap
between the five crimes covered by "crimes against peace." It is
questionable why this case law did not adopt a systematic approach
because a complete analysis of the definition of "crimes against peace"
also requires an examination of the points of overlap between the crimes
thereby covered.
B. Planning,Preparing,Initiating,and Waging a War ofAggression
The ICC Statute requires that an individual be held criminally
responsible if he or she commits the material elements of a crime with
intent and knowledge.6 ° Intent presupposes knowledge but knowledge can
exist independently of intent. 6' The mental element of "crimes against,"
that is the aggressive intent or animus aggression is very important
56. 10 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMES, supra note 49, at 334.
57. United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb (High Command), in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,
supra note 49, at 483.
58. IMTFE Judgment, supranote 43, vol. 20, at 48448-49 (relating specifically to counts 18
to 26 inclusive).
59. The Separate Opinion of the Member for the Netherlands, Judge Bernard Victor R6ling,
in id. vol. 21, at 51. He stated that it was not necessary to decide in detail whether someone planned
or prepared an aggressive war, or conspired in the accomplishment of its planning, preparation,
initiation, and waging. Moreover, he found he had to distinguish between initiating and waging
aggressive war because the former established the latter.
60. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 30.
61. David K. Piragoff, Article 30: MentalElement, in COMMENTARY ONTHE ROME STATUTE,
supra note 1, at 530.
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because that is what transforms mere rearmament for instance into the
preparation of aggressive war, as will be demonstrated below. Although
the case law cited below does not deal in great detail with the question of
aggressive intent, it is implicit in the factual determinations made by the
Tribunals. The IMT determined that Nazi Germany's wars were
aggressive, which implied that they had been committed with an
aggressive intent. Its factual finding were binding on the Allied Military
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10.62 For its part the IMTFE
determined that Japan had waged wars of aggression, which also implied
the existence of an aggressive intent. Having established the aggressive
intent in general terms, the IMT, IMTFE, and Allied Military Tribunals
proceeded to determine the extent of knowledge and participation
individuals had in "crimes against peace."
For instance, the IMT acquitted Kaltenbrunner of the charge of
planning and preparing aggressive war because the evidence did not show
his direct participation in any plan to wage such a war.63 Von Schirach was
acquitted of the same charge because it did not appear that he participated
in the planning or preparation of any of the wars of aggression. ' Schacht
was acquitted of part of the charge to wage aggressive war because his
participation in the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia was so
limited that it did not amount to participation in the common plan, and
because he lacked knowledge of the plans to invade these countries.65
Streicher, Fritzsche, and Bormann were acquitted by the IMT of "crimes
against peach" because there was insufficient evidence that they had
knowledge of Hitler's plans.66

62. Telford Taylor, OrdinanceNo. 7: OrganizationandPowerof CertainMilitary Tribunals,
in FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, app. L, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1949, art. X:
The determinations of the International Military Tribunal in thejudgments In Case
No. 1 that invasions, aggressive acts, aggressive wars, crimes, atrocities or
inhumane acts were planned or occurred, shall be binding on the tribunals
established hereunder and shall not be questioned except insofar as the
participation therein or knowledge thereof by any particular person may be
concerned. Statements of the International Military Tribunal in the judgment in
Case No. 1 constitute proof of the facts stated, in the absence of substantial new
evidence to the contrary.
63.
64.
65.
66.

IMT Judgment, supra note 36, at 284.
Id. at310.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 294, 328, 329.
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The IMTFE acquitted Hata of waging aggressive wars against the
USSR and Mongolia because when the Lake Khassan hostilities occurred
when he was in central China. Also, he was acquitted for the Nomonhan
incident because he was, at that time, the Aide-de-Camp to the Japanese
Emperor and became War Minister just over a week before that incident
concluded.67 Umezu was acquitted with regards to the same incident.
Although the war at Nomonhan had already begun, Umezu had only taken
command of the Kwantung Army only days before the fighting ceased.68
Muto was also acquitted in relation to the Nomonhan incident because this
war was over when he became Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau.
Moreover, he was acquitted of waging aggressive war against France
because he was Chief-of-Staff in the Philippines when Japan attacked
French Indo-China. 69 The IMTFE also acquitted Matsui, a Japanese
General, ofparticipating in a conspiracy to commit "crimes against peace"
because the evidence did not demonstrate that he had actual knowledge of
the purposes and policies of the Japanese conspirators, even though he was
closely associated to them due to his position. Also, he was acquitted of
waging a war of aggression against China specifically because he did not
have knowledge of this war's criminal character and the IMTFE did not
consider justifying a conviction based on his military service alone.7 °
Another example is Judge Wilkins concurring in the Krupp Case, who
stated that participation in "crimes against peace" required a substantial
participation in, and a responsibility for, activities vital to building up the
power of a country to wage war. The requisite criminal intent required was
knowledge that the military power would be used in a manner which
included war as an instrument of national policy according to the KelloggBriand Pact.7 '
In United States v. Carl Krauch (Farben Case),72 the Tribunal
interpreted the IMT judgment as requiring both knowledge and active
participation to be conclusive. 73 The tribunal stated that the plan for
aggressive war was not common or general knowledge in German society.

67. IMTFE Judgment, supra note 43, vol. 20, at 49754.
68. Id. at49350-51.
69. Id. at 49819.
70. Id.at 49814.
71. Special Concurring Opinion of Judge Wilkins on the Dismissal of the Charge of
Aggressive War in the Krupp Case. TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 49, at 456. This led
Judge Wilkins to find the defendants not guilty for "crimes against peace" because their influence
in the course of events was not substantial enough.
72. United States v. Carl Krauch (Farben Case), in 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note
49, at 1.
73. Id. at 1102.
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In order to find the defendants guilty, it would have to be demonstrated
that they were parties to the plan or conspiracy or that they knew of the
plan and furthered its purpose and objective by participating in the
preparation of aggressive war. In examining the question of personal
knowledge, the Tribunal took into consideration the position, authority,
responsibility, and activities of the defendants toward the state and their
position and activities with, or on behalf of, Farben.74 In relation to the
issue of preparation, the Tribunal examined whether the defendants must
have known that by aiding Germany's extensive rearmament effort, they
were preparing for aggressive war. The Tribunal pointed out that if the
case concerned military experts then it would be possible to impute
knowledge that the extent of rearmament was in excess of that necessary
for defensive purposes only. However, this was not the case as the
defendants were not military men. The evidence did not show that any of
them knew of the extent of the planned rearmament, of how far it had
progressed at any given time, or of the armament strength of neighboring
countries. 75 The Tribunal in the FarbenCase concluded that knowledge of
Hitler's intention to wage aggressive war could not be inferred from the
evidence with regards to any of the defendants.76
Judge Hebert, in his concurring opinion in the FarbenCase, stated that
"crimes against peace" required an act of substantial participation
accompanied by the necessary criminal intent.77 Participation in the
policies, planning, and purposes of the Nazi regime constituted "crimes
against peace" after concrete plans were drawn up for waging aggressive
war. Knowledge of the offence Meant that the accused positively knew of
Hitler's intentions to resort to aggressive war. However, he found it
unnecessary for an individual to have knowledge of specific plans for
aggressive war against specific countries as of a certain time, nor was it
necessary for an individual to have exact knowledge of the order in which
states would be aggressed. It had to be established beyond reasonable
doubt that when engaged in substantial participation of crimes against
peace, the accused knew or believed that ultimately the result would be
aggressive war.78 It farther had to be established that the individual
believed that armed force would actually be employed, if necessary, to
achieve the Nazi government's policy of territorial aggrandizement.79

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 1108.
Id. at 1113.
Id. at 1116-24.
8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 49, at 1300 (Herbert, J., concurring).
Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1302-03. While the Farben defendants knew that acts of aggression had been and
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In the Judgment of 25 January 1949 in the Case versus Hermann
Roechling and Others Chargedwith Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity" (Roechling Case), the Superior Military
Court of France stated that in order to establish Roechling's culpability for
"crimes against peace," it was necessary to determine whether his
activities constituted a sufficient and intentional collaboration with Hitler
or Goering in the preparation and waging of the war of aggression.8'
However, the IMT and the Allied Military Tribunals all drew a
distinction between rearmament in the strict sense and the preparation for
a war of aggression. The IMT stated that rearmament in and of itself was
not illegal under its Charter. However, rearmament carried out as part of
a plan to wage aggressive war can be equated to preparation for aggressive
warfare. This is why the IMT acquitted the defendant Schacht although he
was a central figure in Germany's rearmament.82 Judge Anderson,
concurring in the Krupp Case,83 the Tribunal in the FarbenCase,84 as well
as the Superior Military Court in the Roechling Case,85 all supported this
reasoning. Moreover, Judge Hebert in his concurring opinion in the
Farben Case stated that building armament level or developing the "war
potential" of a state may constitute an act of participation in the planning
and preparation for aggressive war provided that such participation is
substantial and is done with the intention to further the aim of such a war.86
Furthermore, the Tribunal in the High Command Case stated that there is

were being carried out against Austria and Czechoslovakia it could not be concluded that this action
amounted to the requisite knowledge or state of mind constituting plans to wage aggressive war.
The fact that they acquired industries as a result, and aided materially to the territorial expansion
by resorting to threats of force do not constitute "crimes against peace." In relation to Poland, the
evidence did not conclude that the defendants knew of a decision to absorb it into the Reich. Judge
Hebert conceded that the defendants knew methods of aggression were being employed and threats
of force being made against Poland prior to Germany's attack, however he considered that there
existed a possibility that due to the increasing stiff resistance to the possibility of war the aggressor
would in fact not go ahead.
80. Judgment of 25 Jan. 1949 in the Case Versus Hermann Roechling and Others Charged
with Crimes Against Peace (Roechling Case), War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Decision
on Writ of Appeal Against the Judgment of 30 June 1948, in 14 TRALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra
note 49, at 1097 app. B.
81. Id. at 1107.
82. IMT Judgment, supranote 36, at 300-01.
83. Special Concurring Opinion of Judge Wilkins on the Dismissal of the charge of
Aggressive War, in 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 49, at 435.
84. Farben Case, in id. vol. VIII, at 1112.
85. Roechling Case, in id. vol. XIV, at 1108.
86. Concurring Opinion of Judge Hebert on the Charges of Crimes Against Peace, Farben
Case, in id. vol. VIII, at 1300.
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no general criterion under international common law for determining the
extent to which a nation may arm and prepare for war. As long as there is
no aggressive intent, there is no evil inherent in a nation making itself
militarily strong. It cited Switzerland as an example, which for her
geographical extent, her population and resources is proportionally
stronger militarily than many nations of the world, however its military
strength is used to implement a national policy that seeks peace and to
maintain its borders against aggression.87
The decisions of the IMT and the IMTFE as well as various decisions
by Allied Military Tribunals all reveal that knowledge and participation
was one decisive factor taken into account in determining guilt or
innocence in relation to "crimes against peace." Whether individuals were
high-ranking governmental or military officials, or whether they had a
particular influence on governmental affairs through their private interests
was not automatically decisive. Instead, the role they played on a policy
level was the other decisive factor and will be discussed below.
C. Participationin a Common Plan or Conspiracy to Commit "Crimes
Against Peace "
The IMTFE indicated that conspiracy to wage aggressive war arose
when two or more persons entered into an agreement to commit that crime.
The conspiracy is followed and furthered by the planning and preparation
for a war of aggression. Those who participate at that stage may be either
original or late adherents. The adherents become conspirators when they
adopt the conspiracy's purpose and plan and prepare for its fulfilment.88
The IMTFE pointed out that not all of the Japanese conspirators were
parties to the conspiracy to commit "crimes against peace" at the
beginning, and that some of those who were parties to it initially had
ceased to be active in its execution before the end. Nevertheless, all of
those who at any time knowingly participated in the execution of the
conspiracy would be guilty of this charge.89
Thus, the Nazi Party programme as expressed in the 25 points
announced in 1920, or its political affirmations as expressed in Mein
Kampf did not alone suffice as planning to commit "crimes against
peace." With regard to conspiracy, it has to be clearly outlined in its
criminal purpose and not too far removed from the time of decision and of

87. High Command Case, in id. vol. XI, at 488.
88. IMTFE Judgment, supra note 43, vol. 20, at 48447-48.
89. Id. at 49769-70.
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action. It was not necessary to establish the existence of a single master
conspiracy between the defendants. 90
In his concurrence in Krupp, Judge Anderson interpreted the IMT's
findings regarding conspiracy as requiring a concrete plan in which two or
more persons participated; such a plan must have a clearly outlined
criminal purpose and must not be too far removed from the time of and
decision of action. 9' The criminal purpose in question was "first to prepare
and then to wage aggressive war." 92
In order to be a participant in either a common plan or a conspiracy the
accused must actually know of such plan or conspiracy. 93 The Tribunal in
the Farben Case, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v.
Falcone,stated that an individual does "not become a party to a conspiracy
by aiding and abetting it, through the sales of supplies or otherwise, unless
he knows of the conspiracy and such knowledge cannot be inferred merely
from the knowledge that the buyer will use the goods illegally." 94
Moreover, Judge Anderson in Krupp found that the defendants'
contribution to the war effort was not made in connection with or
furtherance of any criminal conspiracy or plan to prepare or wage
aggressive war, but was merely motivated by the legitimate interests of the
Krupp firm from a business standpoint. The Krupp firm could not wage
war or aid in doing so independently of the German government. 95 He
deemed it necessary that the evidence show that the defendants
manufactured and sold armaments to the government with the knowledge
that these were going to be used in some invasion or war of aggression,
and with the intent to aid in the accomplishment of the criminal purpose
of those initiating or waging such a war.96 Thus, actual knowledge is
required and must be determined by objective standards and not by relying
on a standard applicable in cases of ordinary negligence. 97 The requisite
knowledge could be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence. Such
knowledge relates to the facts and circumstances that enable an individual
to determine or not that there is a concrete plan to initiate and wage a war

90. IMT Judgment, supra note 36, at 222.
91. Concurring Opinion of Presiding Judge Anderson on the Dismissal of the Charges of
Aggressive War, in 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 49, at 407, 411.
92. Id. at 412.
93. Id. at 407; see also 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supranote 49, at 1127.
94. 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 49, at 1127 (citing United States v. Falcone,
311 U.S. 205, 61 S. Ct. 204, 85 L. Ed. 128 (1940)).
95. Concurring Opinion of Presiding Judge Anderson on the Dismissal of the Charges of
Aggressive War, in 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 49, at 417-19.
96. Id. at 435-36.
97. Id. at 436.
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of aggression. It must be shown that this individual participated in the plan
with the felonious intent to aid in the accomplishment of the criminal
objective.98 The fact that the defendants in the Krupp Case were engaged
in the manufacture of weapons ordinarily employed in offensive warfare
was not deemed to be of determinative significant. There was no evidence
that they were informed (by any government official or anyone else) that
the Krupp firm's armament activities were connected with concrete plans
for aggressive war.99
The Tribunal's findings in the Krupp Case were based on its evaluation
of the facts before it. On the one hand it can be argued that its decision is
a bit too kind to armaments manufacturers given the role they play in
fuelling wars in general. On the other hand, its legal reasoning is consistent
with the findings made above whereby rearmament (which includes arms
manufacturing) should be considered as preparation for aggressive war if
it is accompanied by an animus aggressionis.
Based on the above it is clear that article 25(3) subparagraphs (a) to (d)
of the ICC Statute are compatible with "crimes against peace" as
adjudicated by the Second World War case law, and therefore compatible
with customary international law. Taken as a whole, the text of the IMT
Charter, the IMTFE Charter and Control Council Law No. 10 dealt with
individuals participating directly (those who planned, prepared, initiated,
or waged a war of aggression), individuals participating indirectly (leaders,
organizers and, instigators), as well as accomplices. These three categories
of perpetrators are reflected in subparagraphs (a) to (c) of article 25(3) of
the ICC Statute.
Also, the reference to the "common plan or conspiracy" to commit
aggression in the IMT Charter is compatible with subparagraph (d) of
article 25(3) in relation to the criminal responsibility of an individual
contributing to the a crime by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose. The Allies relied on the crime of participation in a common plan
or conspiracy as the lynchpin that ensured that the leaders of the Nazi
regime who were responsible for the war would not go unpunished. They
did not really consider relying on other prosecutorial techniques that would
have yielded the same result such as command responsibility or complicity
through a "joint criminal enterprise" a that time. 100 Article 6 infine of the

98. Id.
99. Id. at 439.
100. William A. Schabas, Originsof the CriminalizationofAggression:How Crimes Against
Peace Became the 'Supreme InternationalCrime, 'in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND
THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 25-30 (Mauro Politi & Guisepe Nesi eds., 2004); Jonathan A. Bush,
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IMT Charter was drafted in broad terms and made the crime of
participation in a common plan or conspiracy apply to "crimes against
peace" as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Individuals
charged under the crime of participation in a common plan or conspiracy
could be held responsible for "all acts performed by any persons in
execution of such plan."' 1° However, the IMT interpreted this provision
and the conspiracy count narrowly, that is, as applying only to "crimes
against peace" and disregarded the charges of conspiracy to commit war
crimes or crimes against humanity.'02 When applied to the "crime of
aggression," article 25(3) subparagraph (d)(I) of the ICC Statute
essentially reverses the IMT's decision on this point. Subparagraph (d)(I)
criminalizes the contribution to the commission of a crime by a group of
persons acting with a common purpose; this contribution must
intentionally aim at furthering the group's criminal activity or criminal
purpose, and the activity or purpose in question must involve the
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC.° 3 Suppose that
State A (a State-party to the ICC Statute) and State B (a non-party State to
the ICC Statute) form a coalition and decide to attack, invade, and occupy
State C (another non-party State to the ICC Statute). State A can be held
liable for war crimes committed by State B in the territory of State C
because State A is part of a "joint criminal enterprise" to commit a crime
within the jurisdiction of the ICC Statute, namely the "crime of
aggression." A prosecution before the ICC for this scenario would not be
contrary to article 5(2) of the ICC Statute because it entails the exercise of
jurisdiction over war crimes and not over the "crime of aggression."'
A person accused of such a crime can attempt to challenge it by stating
that although the crime at the heart of the "joint criminal enterprise," that
is, the "crime of aggression" falls within the jurisdiction of the ICC, it has
not yet been defined, which is a violation of the principle of legality,
nullum crime sine lege, under article 22(2) of the ICC Statute. 10 5 The
Prosecutor can counter this challenge based on the exception provided for
in article 15(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) which states that the principle of legality shall not "prejudice the

"The Supreme... Crime" andIts Origins: The Lost LegislativeHistory of the Crime ofAggressive
War, 102 COLuM. L. REV. 2324, 2363-64 (2002).
101. IMT Charter, supra note 23, art. 6 infine.
102. IMT Judgment, supra note 36, at 224.
103. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 25(3)(d)(i).
104. Id. art. 5(2).
105. Id. art. 22(2); see Bruce Broomhall, Article 22: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 1, at 456-59.
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trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the
time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general
principles of law recognized by the community of nations."' 6 However,
the accused can contradict this assertion based on two arguments. The first
is based on article 22(3) of the ICC Statute which states that "this article
shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under
international law independently of this Statute."'0 17 The second argument
is based on article 21 which specifies that the application of the ICC
Statute takes precedence over applicable treaties, principles and rules of
international law. 0 8 Nevertheless, the Prosecution could invoke the rule
whereby the application and interpretation of law pursuant to article 21 of
the ICC Statute must be consistent with internationally recognized human
rights,0 9 thereby maintaining the validity of the exception in article 15(2)
of the ICCPR. Ultimately the ICC will have to decide this question.
D. Incitement to Commit Aggression
The SWGCA proposed to deal with the leadership nature of the "crime
of aggression" by adding in article 25(3) of the ICC Statute a new
subparagraph (e) bis. Accordingly two proposals were put forward
specifying that the "crime of aggression" would aim at punishing persons
in a position to effectively exercise control over the political or military
action of the state." 0
However, it is not absolutely clear whether the SWGCA wished to
criminalize the incitement of aggression. On the one hand, the SWGCA
stated in its report that the new subparagraph (e) bis regarding the
leadership aspect of aggression would be modelled on the existing
subparagraph (e) which deals with direct and public incitement to commit
genocide."' On the other hand, the two proposals put forward do not deal
in any way with incitement to commit aggression. In fact, "Proposal A"
specifically states that the leadership aspect of the "crime of aggression"
would only apply to subparagraphs (a) to (d) of Article 25(3).

106. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 15(2)
[hereinafter ICCPR]; see Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 223; Eur. T.S. 5, art. 7(2); Nicolaos Strapatsas, Book
Review: The Crime of Aggression, 15 CLF no. 4 (forthcoming 2005).
107. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 22(3).
108. Id.art.
21(1).
109. Id.art. 21(3).
110. SWGCA Report, supra note 12, Annex I, Proposals A & B.
111. Id. 20.
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Two important things must be noted at this point. The first thing is that
in this section the assumption is made that what was meant by the
SWGCA was to create a new subparagraph (e) bis that would criminalize
the direct and public incitement to commit aggression and specify that the
"crime of aggression" was a leadership crime. The second thing is that this
section will only address the question of whether the direct and public
incitement to commit aggression is a crime under international law. The
leadership aspect of the crime will be dealt with in the next section of this
Article.
Under international law, the crime of direct and public incitement
relates only to genocide. It derives from article 3(c) of the 1948 Genocide
Convention and was reproduced in article 25(3)(e) of the ICC Statute.
Incitement is an inchoate crime, that is, an offence in and of itself
regardless of whether genocide actually occurs following such
incitement."l 2 At the Rome Conference, attempts at extending article
25(3)(e) to cover crimes against humanity and war crimes failed." 3
The Charters of the IMT, the IMTFE, and Control Council Law No. 10
did not criminalize the direct and public incitement of aggression under
"crimes against peace." Propaganda for war was only one indicator
considered by the IVT 1 4 and the IMTFE 115 in their judgments when
establishing the existence
of the common plan or conspiracy to commit
"crimes against peace."' 16

112. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 102
(2d ed. 2004); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE ININTERNATIONAL LAW 266-80 (2000).
113. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE ININTERNATIONAL LAW, supranote 112, at 272.
114. IMT Judgment, supranote 36, at 187-88,222. In acquitting Fritzsche of "crimes against
peace," the IMT noted that although he became the head of the Radio Division of the Propaganda
Ministry and Plenipotentiary for the Political Organization of the Greater German Radio, he
remained subordinate to Dietrich, the Reich Press Chief, who was a subordinate of Goebbels. Each
Nazi major act of Nazi aggression was preceded by a vigorous propaganda campaign, however
Fritzsche had no control of the formulation of the propaganda policies and served merely as a
conduit to the press of the instructions handed him by Dietrich. The IMT concluded that Fritzsche
had not achieved a sufficient stature to attend the planning conferences that led to aggressive war
and he was not informed of the decisions taken at these conferences. His activities could not fall
within the definition of the common plan to wage aggressive war. See id. at 327-28.
115. IMTFE Judgment, supra note 43, at 48517-19, 48566, 48589-92, 48658-60, 48759-61.
Shiratori was acquitted of all counts relating to "crimes against peace" except for count 1 relating
to the participation in the common plan or conspiracy. In finding him guilty of this crime, the
IMTFE relied heavily on his role in forming, publishing, and supporting Japanese propaganda for
aggressive war. See id. at 49835-37.
116. For an overview of the concept of war-mongering and propaganda for war, see Wright
Quincy, The Crime ofWar-Mongering,42 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1948); John B. Whitton, Aggressive
Propaganda,in 1 INTERNATIONALCRIMINALLAW 238 (M. CherifBassiouni & Ved P. Nanada eds.,
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Nonetheless, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution 110(11)
(1947) entitled: "Measures to be Taken Against Propaganda and the
Inciters of a New War," in which it condemns all forms of propaganda
designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression.' 17 The General Assembly also adopted
the "Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations" contained in resolution 2625 (1970), which
imposes on states the "duty to refrain from propaganda for wars of
aggression" in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United
Nations." 8 Moreover, the ICCPR, as an exception to the freedom of
expression, states that: "any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by
law."" 9 The prohibition in this context relates to propaganda for
aggressive war. 20 It also provides for the prohibition by law of any
advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination, hostility, or violence, which
parallels the crime of direct
2
'
genocide.1
commit
to
incitement
and public
It is evident that propaganda for war is a broader notion than direct and
public incitement to commit aggression. However, the creation of a crime
of direct and public incitement to commit aggression in the future under
the ICC Statute would be firmly based on the legal obligation contained
in the ICCPR as well as being its logical consequence.
E. Policy Level Requirement
As indicated above, the SWGCA sought to make article 25(3) of the
ICC Statute compatible with the notions of leadership nature of the "crime

1973); S.V. Molodcov, The Principlethat States Should Refrainfrom the Threat or Use of Force
in InternationalRelations, in THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-

OPERATION AMONG STATES 38-39 (M.K. Nawaz et al. eds., 1966).
117. Measures to be Taken Against Propaganda and the Inciters of a New War, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/i10(11).
118. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and CoOperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2625(XXV), Annex, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28), U.N. Dec. A/5217 (1970), at 121,
princ. 1, 3.
119. ICCPR, supra note 106, art. 20(1).
120. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N.

COVENANT ON CWIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR

COMMENTARY 473 (2d ed. 2005); see Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General
Comment No. 11: Prohibition of Propaganda for War and Inciting National, Racial or Religious
Hatred, art. 20, 2(1983) [hereinafter General Comment No. 11], available at http://www.
unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/60dcfa23f32d3feac 12563ed00491355?Opendocument.
121. General Comment No. 11, supra note 120, art. 20(2).
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of aggression"' 22 and two proposals were made to this effect.'23 Various
cases from the Second World War developed a policy level requirement
in their analysis of "crimes against peace" in order to deal with this
particular issue.
The IMT recognized that the aggressive designs of the Nazi
government were not accidents arising out of the immediate political
situation in Europe and the world, but were a deliberate and essential part
of Nazi foreign policy.'24 Beyond this, it did not elaborate the policy level
requirement of "crimes against peace" extensively in its main judgment.
This is perhaps explained by the fact that in practical terms it did not need
to do so. There was no question of trying lower level perpetrators but only
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, that is, the highest-ranking
political and military officials as provided for by articles 1 and 6 of the
IMT Charter. 25
' Nevertheless, in acquitting Streicher of all charges relating
to "crimes against peace," the IMT took into account the fact that the
evidence did not show that he was ever within Hitler's inner circle of
advisers; nor during his career was he closely connected with the
formulation
of the policies leading to war, nor had he knowledge of these
26
policies.'
Although the IMTFE's Charter contained a similar provision in relation
to the Major War Criminals in the Far East,' 27 its Judgment made reference
to the issue of formulating and supporting the Japanese policy of waging
aggressive war in determining the guilt of certain individuals in relation to
the charges of conspiracy and of committing "crimes against peace. ' 28 in
relation to Sato, the IMTFE stated:
It was not until 1941 that SATO attained a position which by itself
enabled him to influence the making of policy, and no evidence has
been adduced that prior to that date he had indulged in plotting to
influence the making of policy. The crucial question is whether by
that date he had become aware that Japan's designs were criminal,
for thereafter he furthered the129
development and execution of these
designs as far as he was able.
122. SWGCA Report, supra note 12, 20.
123. See supra text accompanying note 109.
124. IMT Judgment, supra note 36, at 187.
125. IMT Charter, supra note 23, arts. 1, 6.
126. IMT Judgment, supra note 36, at 294.
127. IMTFE Charter, supra note 26, art. 1.
128. IMTFE Judgment, supra note 43, vol. 20, at 49787, 49823, 49828, 49844
(pronouncements by IMTFE against the defendants Hiranuma, Oshima, Shigemitsu and Tojo).
129. Id.at 49826.
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Judge RM1ing, in his dissenting opinion, acknowledged the importance of
the policy level requirement regarding "crimes against peace" but drew a
distinction as to whether an individual was a member or not of the
government. He stated that the simple fact of having been a member of a
government that decided to wage aggressive war or that was in the process
of waging such a war did not suffice to warrant a conviction for "crimes
against peace." The intention with which this individual entered
government was decisive. 3 ° Judge R61ing dissented on the conviction of
five defendants for "crimes against peace" because he differed with the
majority in the interpretation of the facts.' Thus, in relation to the
defendant Shigemitsu, he stated:
If one has entered a War Cabinet, such as the Tojo or Koiso
Cabinet, with the intention of promoting peace, and of bringing to
speedy end the war already in progress, one cannot be said to have
waged that aggressive war. This war was planned and initiated by
individuals, but once started, it assumed an impersonal existence of
its own. However, those individuals who after the outbreak if war
are appointed to public functions in the war machine but who
actively support the aggressive policy which prolongs the war, such
individuals may be guilty of the crime of waging war. But he who
assumed public office in order to oppose that war, who accepts his
appointment in order to promote peace,
cannot and should not be
13 2
accused of waging an aggressive war.
Judge R6ing based his position on the findings of the IMT with
regards to Speer.'33 He came to similar findings with regard to the
defendant Togo.'3 4 He also found that the defendant Kido should have
been acquitted for "crimes against peace" because he did not actively
support Japan's policy of aggressive war but in fact opposed this.'35
In relation to individuals outside government, Judge RM1ing, citing the
example of the Army, found that when such individuals assume a position
that makes them a "decisive agent in the formulation of the State policy,"

130. The Separate Opinion of the Member for the Netherlands, Judge Bernard Victor R61ing,
in id. vol. 21, at 236.
131. These were defendants Hata, Hirota, Kido, Shigemitsu and Togo.
132. IMTFE Judgment, supra note 43, vol. 21, at 236 (Separate Opinion of the Member for
the Netherlands, Judge Bernard Victor R61ing).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 249.
135. Id. at 219-26.
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they can wage aggressive war.'36 He noted that the Army could not wage
aggressive war by carrying out its normal duties, namely, executing the
commands of the Executive. 37 This led him to the conclusion that
defendant Hata should have been acquitted for "crimes against peace."' 38
Soldiers and sailors that perform a strictly military function should never
be considered to wage an aggressive war in the sense of the IMTFE
Charter, even if they are Generals or Admirals, as long as they do not, in
that capacity, decide government policy. 3 9 Accordingly, only the
government and those authorities who carry out governmental functions
and are instrumental in formulating policy actually wage aggressive war. 40
The Allied Military Tribunals saw charges of "crimes against peace"
being brought before them against individuals that were not necessarily
Major War Criminals. Accordingly, they developed in detail the policy
level requirement of this crime. The defendants before the tribunals were
all acquitted of charges related to "crimes against peace" essentially
because none of them were on a policy level.
The Tribunal in the High Command Case stated that war results from
the implementation of a predetermined national policy, which is drawn up
by individuals:' 4 '
If the policy under which it is initiated is criminal in its intent and
purpose it is so because the individuals at the policy-making level
had a criminal intent and purpose in determining the policy. If war
is the means by which the criminal objective is to be attained then
the waging of the war is but an implementation of the policy, and
the criminality which attaches to the waging of an aggressive war
should be confined to those who participate in it at the policy level.
[..
If and as long as a member of the armed forces does not participate
in the preparation, planning, initiating, or waging of aggressive war
on a policy level, his war activities do not fall under the definition
of crimes against peace. It is not a person's rank or status, but his
power to shape or influence the policy of his state, which is the

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.at 52.
IMTFE Judgment, supra note 43, at 52.
Id.at 188.
Id.
Id.
11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supranote 49, at 485, 490.
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relevant issue for determining
his criminality under the charge of
14 2
crimes against peace.

The Tribunal refused to accept that Hitler alone had to bear criminal
responsibility for the Nazi policies of aggressive war even though he was
the Dictator of the Third Reich and Supreme Commander in both civil and
military fields. Hitler could not formulate these policies of aggressive143war
alone and implement them by planning, preparing, and waging war.
The IMT had stated that the Major Nazi War Criminals could not
invoke the fact that Germany at the time was a complete dictatorship
thereby absolving them from participation in crimes against peace:
A plan in the execution of which a number of persons participate is
still a plan, even though conceived by only one of them; and those
who execute the plan do not avoid responsibility by showing that
they acted under the direction of the man who conceived it. Hitler
could not make aggressive war by himself. He had to have the cooperation of statesmen, military leaders, diplomats, and business
men. When they, with knowledge of his aims, gave him their cooperation, they made themselves parties to the plan he had initiated.
They are not to be deemed innocent because Hitler made use of
them, if they knew what they were doing. That they were assigned
to their tasks by a dictator does not absolve them from
responsibility for their acts."
The Tribunal in the High CommandCase found that although making
national policy is essentially a political act, it requires the consideration of
military matters once war becomes an element of such policy. 45 The
accused must have knowledge that an aggressive war is intended and that
if launched it will be an aggressive war. However, mere knowledge does
not suffice to make participation even by high ranking military officers in
this war a criminal offense. The additional requirement is that the accused,
after having acquired this knowledge, is in a position to shape or influence

142. Id. at 486-89.
143. Id. at 486.
144. IMT Judgment, supra note 36, at 223. The IMTFE also acknowledge that the "farreaching plans for waging wars of aggression and the prolonged and intricate preparation for and
waging of these wars of aggression were not the work of one man. They were the work of many
leaders acting in pursuance of a common plan for the achievement of a common object." See
IMTFE Charter, supra note 43, vol. 20, at 49768.
145. 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 49, at 490.
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such policy. If this individual affects such policy as to initiate the war or
to continue it, he or she becomes criminally responsible. If he or she
hinders or prevents the war, to the extent of their ability, then he or she
lacks the criminal intent regarding such war policy. If an individual did not
know that the war in which he or she was involved in planning and
preparing was aggressive then this individual cannot be guilty of crimes
against peace. However, this individual is criminally responsible if he
learnt after the policy was formulated that such war was aggressive and
being in a position to influence such policy to the contrary but failed to do
so.' 46 After the initiation of the war of aggression, the policy question then
becomes that of extending and continuing the war or otherwise
discontinuing it.' 47 Those who are below the policy level and who execute
such policy by planning and carrying out military campaigns merely act
as instruments of the policymakers and are not subject to criminal
responsibility.'48 The spectrum of action in question includes the Dictator
or Supreme Commander on one end (Hitler) and the common soldier on
the other end. Amid this is the division between individuals whose
participation in the waging of aggressive war is criminal and those whose
participation is excusable. Although, Control Council Law No. 10 did not
definitely draw such a line, the Tribunal fixed the demarcation at the
policy level.' 49
Thus, the accused individuals in the High Command Case were
acquitted of the charge of "crimes against peace" for not being on the
policy level even though they were "only one or two steps removed from
Goering, Keitel, Jodl, Doenitz, and Raeder, defendants in the IMT case."' 5 °
The Tribunal in the Farben Case focused on the defendant Krauch,
who was considered to be the link between Farben and the Reich, and
found that he was beneath the membership of the circle of individuals that
planned the wars of aggression (which is equivalent to those at the policy
level). 5 ' He did not have any opportunity to participate in this planning
either generally or in relation to specific wars. Moreover, Krauch had no
connection with the initiation of any of the invasions or wars of
aggressions because he was neither informed of the time nor the method

146. Id. at 489-90.
147. Id.at 490.
148. Id.at491.
149. Id.at 486.
150. 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 477. Four of the defendants were
leading Staff Officers and the nine others were all top level Field Commanders.
151. The other defendants were even further removed from the scene of Nazi governmental
activity than was Krauch.
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of initiation. 5 2 The Tribunal stated that nothing in the IMT Charter or in
Control Council Law No. 10 indicated that the term "waging a war of
aggression" was intended to apply to any and all persons who aided,
supported, or contributed to the carrying on of an aggressive war. Thus,
basing itself on the IMT Judgment it held that the liability of individuals
should be limited, for instance, to those in the political, military, and
industrial fields who are responsible for the formulation and execution of
policies that result in their state carrying out a war of aggression. The
defendants participated as followers and not as leaders. They were not
policymakers, high public officials in the civil government, or high
military officers. A departure from this concept would make it difficult to
find a logical place to draw the line between the guilty and the innocent
among the entire population of the aggressor-state, and no practical
limitation on individual criminal responsibility would apply. Theoretically,
"the private soldier on the battlefield, the farmer who has increased his
production of foodstuffs to sustain the armed forces, or the housewife who
conserved fats for the making of munitions" could all be held accountable
for waging wars of aggression by the uncontrolled discretion of the
indicting authorities.'53
Both Judges Anderson and Wilkins in their separate individual
concurring opinions held that the defendants in the Krupp Case did not
hold positions on a policymaking level as required by crimes against
peace.'54 Judge Anderson stated:
None of them had any voice in the policies which led their nation
into aggressive war; nor were any of them privies to that policy.
None had any control over the conduct of the war or over any of the
armed forces; nor were any of them parties to the plans pursuant to
which the wars were waged and so far as appears, none of them had
any knowledge of such plans.'5 5
If the threat of criminal prosecution and punishment would deter the
individuals at this specific level, then no war would occur. 56 Judge
Anderson acknowledged that although the defendants' activities in
connection with the war consisted primarily in the performance of their
duties as employees of a private enterprise engaged for profit in the

152. 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 49, at 1112.

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1125.
466 (Wilkins, J., concurring). See also id. at 449-50.
449 (Anderson, J., concurring).
450.
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manufacture and sale of armament, together with membership by some of
them in the economic and industrial associations organized to aid in the
war effort, this did not amount to acting on a policy level.' 57 He stressed
the importance of this element of "crimes against peace" and resisted any
attempt to extend its scope beyond the leaders, the policymakers and their
privies, to private citizens called upon to aid their country's war effort. He
considered such an extension would not only violate the principle
forbidding ex post facto law and be a form of mass punishment, but it
would be of no practical usefulness because it would be virtually
impossible to draw the demarcation line thereby potentially putting at risk
every private citizen of criminal punishment. He cited the example of
Doenitz who was convicted by the IMT for waging aggressive war but
acquitted for participation in the planning and initiation of aggressive war
and participation in the planning and initiation of aggressive war as well
as the common plan or conspiracy to wage aggressive war. This was based
on the fact that his status changed from a mere "line officer performing
strictly tactical duties" to a position of leadership in 1943 in charge of the
direction and operation of submarine warfare.' 58
The example of Doenitz runs parallel to the acquittal of Shigemitsu by
the IMTFE of the conspiracy charge but his conviction for waging
aggressive war on several counts. This was because Shigemitsu only
became Foreign Minister of Japan in 1943, after the policy of the Japanese
conspirators to wage aggressive war had been settled and was in the course
of its execution. No further formulation or development of this policy had
occurred thereafter. 5 9
The Superior Military Court in the Roechling Case in overturning
Hermann Roechling's conviction for "crimes again peace" by a Tribunal
of first instance stated that it did not wish to go beyond the boundary that
was fixed very high by the IMT (the policy level) to go as far as the lowest
ranks, such as the ordinary soldier. 6 °
Of all the cases and judicial opinions produced in relation to the Second
World War regarding "crimes against peace," the President of the IMTFE,
Judge Sir William Flood Webb, in his separate concurring opinion, is the
157.

8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 49, at 449.

158. Id. at 452; see IMT Judgment, supranote 36, at 302-03, 306.
159. IMTFE Judgment, supra note 43, at 49828.
160.

14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 49, at 1108-10. The Superior Military Court

did not consider that in contributing thusly to the war effort of his country, Roechling played a
leading part within the meaning of crimes against peace in Control Council Law No. 10 because
he took over the direction of the iron industry long after the outbreak of the war. The Superior
Military Court also cited the example of Speer who was acquitted by the IMT for participation in
the conduct of the war.
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only one who suggested that "crimes against peace" were not subject to a
policy level requirement. He stated that the view that aggressive war was
illegal and had to be taken to its logical conclusion. Consequently, a
soldier or a civilian was guilty of waging aggressive war if he or she
opposed the war but decided after it began to carry on until a more
favorable time for making peace would arise. 161 Moreover, Judge Flood
Webb saw no special rules that would limit the responsibility for waging
aggressive war, no matter how high or low the rank or status of the person
promoting or taking part in it, provided that the individual
in question
62
knew or should have known that the war was aggressive. 1
In addition to the practical consideration of drawing a line in relation
to the prosecution of "crimes against peace" and avoiding collective
punishment mentioned above, there are a number of reasons why Judge
Flood Webb's position is invalid.
An individual can be in a situation where he or she is legally obligated
to contribute to the war effort of his or her country. The government can
impose special measures on its citizens such as conscription or mandatory
financial contributions aimed at supporting the war. Although this is not
a situation of duress as defined in article 3 1(1) subparagraph (d) of the ICC
Statute, it would be preposterous to suggest that an individual in such a
situation committed "crimes against peace" if he or she knew that the war
in question is aggressive in nature.
Aside from this, the further away one moves from the policy level
requirement of "crimes against peace," the higher the likelihood that an
individual will not be in a position to know whether the war in question is
aggressive. For example, a soldier is trained to adhere to a command
structure and to follow the orders given to him or her from above without
questioning them. This is reinforced by the potential of disciplinary or
legal sanctions in case of disobedience. The soldier and the private citizen
are not in a position to know with absolute certainty whether the war is
aggressive. Although the soldier and the private citizen can inform
themselves from the media and the information provided to them by the
government, this does not amount to first hand knowledge of the actual
facts behind the decision to go to war. Such information is often subjected
to restrictions that can include the protection of national security
information. Some situations may require extensive fact-finding which is
beyond the capabilities of the soldier and private citizen. Moreover, a state

161. The Separate Opinion of the President of the Tribunal, Judge Sir William Flood Webb,
in IMTFE Judgment, supra note 43, vol. 21, at 7.
162. Id.
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will never admit that it is committing aggression. Instead it will rely on a
pretext or justification for doing so.
Therefore if a soldier or private citizen cannot know directly that a war
is aggressive, it is even less likely that he or she should have known this
fact. The ICC Statute under article 28 subparagraph (a) allows for an
individual to be held criminally responsible for a crime that he or she knew
or should have known about. However, this specifically applies to
commanders or persons effectively acting as such for acts committed by
their subordinates. It is entirely incompatible with attributing criminal
responsibility to low-level soldiers or private citizens as suggested by
Judge Flood Webb. Moreover, one cannot invoke negligence (should have
known), which is a crime without genuine intent, in order to prosecute an
individual for "crimes against peace" because this crime requires a specific
intent, this is the "foreknowledge of specific illegal ends and intentional
conduct to achieve those ends."' 63 Thus, an individual must intentionally
and knowingly plan, prepare, initiate, or wage a war, and must intend this
war to be illegal under international law thereby making it aggressive.
V. ATTEMPT

The SWGCA noted in its report the importance of distinguishing
between the collective act of aggression by a state and the participation by
an individual in such an act."6 Article 25(3)(f) of the ICC Statutes relates
to an attempt to commit the "crime of aggression," that is, the attempt by
an individual to participate
in the collective act of aggression, and not to
65
the collective act per se.1
Accordingly, three situations merit consideration, two of which relate
to the collective act of aggression by a state, whereas the third relates to
the attempt by an individual to commit the "crime of aggression."
First, a situation can arise where an act of aggression is planned,
prepared, initiated, and executed by a state against another state, however
the latter withstands the attack and repels it. For example, State A invades
the territory of State B but the latter's army immediately pushes back the
invading forces completely. This situation demonstrates the occurrence of
an act of aggression and should not be confused with an attempted act of

163. Bush, supra note 100, at 2387. A parallel can also be drawn between the "crime of
aggression" and the specific intent required for genocide. See SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 112, at 226-27.
164. SWGCA Report, supra note 12, 33.
165. Id. 82.
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aggression. The fact that State A's invasion was unsuccessful is irrelevant
because the act of aggression was initiated and executed. Its failure is due
entirely to the self-defense capabilities of the aggressed state.
The second situation is where an act of aggression is planned, prepared,
and initiated but is not executed against the target state. For example, State
A fires missiles against the territory of State B and these miss entirely and
fall in the sea due to faulty equipment or miscalculation. There is no
apology or attempt to indicate that the missile launch was a mistake or an
accident. This is an attempted act of aggression and does not reach the
threshold of a completed act of aggression. The individuals involved
would be tried for planning, preparing, and initiating an attempted act of
aggression.
The third situation is the attempt to commit the "crime of aggression,"
by attempting to participate in the collective act of aggression. Under the
ICC Statute, "attempt" is an inchoate crime. Even if the planned crime is
not executed, entirely or partially, due to circumstances independent of the
individual's intentions, it remains punishable as an attempt, on condition
that he or she took a substantial step towards its execution (which is left
up to the ICC to determine).' 66 The SWGCA took the view that the
existing case law from the Second World War related only to acts of
aggression that had in fact been committed and did not cover this
situation.'67 However, case of Swiss FederalProsecutorv. Josef Franz
Barwirsch(Barwirsch Case)'68 decided by the Federal Criminal Court of
Switzerland in 1946 is instrumental when considering the attempt to
commit the "crime of aggression." Barwirsch dealt with the
criminalization of the attempted planning and preparation of an
annexation,69 that is, an act of aggression that was not executed or
attempted.
Barwirsch was charged with having committed an "attack on the
independence of the Swiss Confederation" under article 266, subsection
I, of the Swiss Criminal Code. 17 Under this provision, an individual was

166. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 25(3)(f). However, the Statute also indicates that a person
will not incur liability provided that he or she completely and voluntarily gives up his or her
criminal purpose and abandons or prevents the crime's completion. See Ambos, supra note 16, at
489-90.
167. SWGCA Report, supra note 7, 39.
168. Swiss Federal Prosecutor v. Josef Franz Barwirsch, Bundes Gerichts Entscheidungen
[BGE] [Federal Criminal Court] Dec. 16-20, 1946,3631 Bstr. 3 (Switz.) [hereinafter Barwirsch].
169. The IMT found Germany's annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia were acts of
aggression.
170. Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Criminal Code] vom. 21, Dec. 21, 1937, art.
266 [hereinafter Swiss Criminal Code].
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liable to prosecution for carrying out an act with the aim of violating or
endangering the independence of the Confederation, especially of
endangering the independence of the Confederation by bringing about the
interference of a foreign power in federal affairs.' 7 ' Also, he was charged
under the Swiss Criminal Code with political and military espionage,' 72
and military espionage against foreign states,' 73 as well as treasonable
breach of military secrecy under the Swiss Military Penal Code.174
The Court found Barwirsch guilty because he aimed to eliminate
Switzerland's independence and subjugate it to Nazi Germany. He tried to
convince Seyss-Inquart and other influential German officials through
submissions, reports, memoranda, and verbally, that the Third Reich
should annex all or part of Switzerland or at least integrate it therein in
some form. Consequently, the federal constitution and cantonal
constitutions to be abolished or modified, a national socialist government
dependent on the Third Reich would be established, race laws would be
introduced, Jews would be persecuted, and a part of the population would
be displaced into other areas of the Third Reich.'75
Germany never attempted to annex Switzerland. However, the Court
considered it irrelevant that Barwirsch did not achieve his aim. The crime
contained in article 266, subsection I, covered any action, which aimed to
violate the independence of the Confederation. Article 266 also covered
actions that aimed to endanger the independence of the Confederation,
including bringing about the interference of a foreign power in Swiss
federal affairs.'76
The Court interpreted the crime in article 266, subsection I, as covering
action taken merely toward a situation tantamount to endangering
Switzerland's independence as well as an actual violation thereof."' The
171. Barwirsch,3631 Bstr. 3. It should be noted that article 266, subsection II, of the Swiss
Criminal Code criminalized the action of a person who entered into a relationship with the
government of a foreign state or its agents, in order to bring about a war against the Swiss
Confederation. He drew up plans for Switzerland's annexation without resolving to actual war
along the lines of Austria's annexation by Germany. He had considered making Switzerland a
theatre of war but only as a last resort. The Court concluded that based on the evidence it was not
certain that Barwirsch wanted to bring about a war or that he foresaw and desired war as a possible
effect of his contacts with Seyss-Inquart and other Germans, nor that he saw and approved of a
means to bring about war through his own actions. Consequently, the Court found that article 266,
subsection II, was not applicable. See id. 4.
172. Swiss Criminal Code, supra note 170, arts. 272, 274.
173. Id. art. 301.
174. Militarstrafgesetz vom 13, Juni 1927, MstG (Swiss Military Penal Code), art. 86.
175. Barwirsch, 3631 Bstr. 3.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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Court stated that not all acts of preparation were covered, but only those78
that were not far removed from the actual danger or violation.
Accordingly, the Court defined danger as meaning a concrete danger, that
is, a situation that does not simply make a violation possible in objective
terms, but brings about a situation which would probably develop further,
with or without the actions of the perpetrator in the nearer or more distant
1 79
future, such as to bring about a violation in the normal course of events.
The Court found that Barwirsch's aim of violating Switzerland's
independence had progressed far enough to fall under the crime in
question. His actions exceeded the mere preparation of a state of danger
to the Confederation and had in fact already endangered its independence.
The Court recalled the examples of Nazi Germany's actions in Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Norway, Holland, and other countries. The Germans
listened to Barwirsch and valued him because he provided them
intelligence used to prepare Switerland's annexation, and because
Barwirsch potentially played an auxiliary role at the "stage of interim
solutions" thereafter. 8 0 Moreover, Switzerland's independence was all the
more endangered by Barwirsch's direct contact with Seyss-Inquart, one of
the architects of the annexation of Austria. The Court indicated that
Barwirsch acted knowingly and wilfully. He was fully aware of the danger
he brought to Switzerland's independence. Moreover, Barwirsch's
awareness of the illegality of his actions was deduced from the fact that he
sought to abolish or modify, with Germany's help, the federal constitution
and the constitution of the cantons in an unconstitutional and illegal
manner. 181

In sentencing Barwirsch to twenty years imprisonment, the Court noted
that he was in contact with leading figures of the Third Reich for years and
submitted to them detailed plans for the annexation of Switzerland thereto.
Barwirsch played no part in the fact that these plans were never realized.
He personally wished that preparations had begun in 1939 with the goal of
bringing about the annexation by 1942. Barwirsch also spread false
information and told the Nazi authorities that a large proportion of the
Swiss population was ready for annexation, and that the situation in the
country was similar or even more favourable for an annexation than the
situation in Austria in 1938. In order to convince the Nazis of this,
Barwirsch stated that he had supporters that shared his aspirations. Given

178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Barwirsch,3631 Bstr. 3.
Id.
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at the time, Switzerland's
the volatile political situation in Europe
82
danger.
great
in
fact
in
was
independence
Taken on face value, one can correctly conclude that Barwirsch was
prosecuted for treason. However, treason can include various forms of
behavior such as the sale of military secrets, or as in the BarwirschCase,
the preparation for a foreign power to invade, occupy and annex one's
country. If Nazi German had annexed Switzerland as planned, then this
would have amounted to a completed act of aggression and Barwirsch
could have been prosecuted for the "crime of aggression." This latter
scenario would be analogous to the trial of Artur Greiser (Greiser Trial)
decided by the Supreme National Tribunal of Poland. 183 He was a citizen
of the Free City of Danzig and a member of the Nazi Party since 1930. He
used his position as President of the Danzig Senate together with other
members of the Nazi Party to bring about the seizure of Danzig and the
incorporation of Western Polish territories into the German Reich.
Evidently, his actions were treasonous. However, he was tried for
preparing, directing, and executing a war of aggression.' 84
VI. CONCLUSION

The commonalities between Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute and
"crimes against peace" derived from the IMT Charter are striking. There
is no practical difference if the SWGCA chooses to depart from the
language derived from the IMT Charter while framing the "crime of
aggression" and opts for the default language in the ICC Statute. For
instance, the ICC will have to interpret subparagraphs (a) and (b) of article
25(3) of its Statute in light of the Second World War case law relating to
"crimes against peace." Thus, in order to establish whether an individual
committed, ordered, induced, or solicited the "crime of aggression," the
ICC will necessarily examine whether the accused planned, prepared,
initiated, or waged aggressive warfare. As regards the issue of complicity,
article 25(3), subparagraph (c), punishes the aiding and abetting of a crime
whereas article 6 infine of the IMT Charter dealt with accomplices. The
difference in this case is one of vocabulary and not one of substance.
Moreover, it is highly probable that the same objectives will be met by
prosecuting an individual either for participating in a common plan or

182. Id. 8
183. U.N. War Crimes Commission, The Greiser Trial, in 13
WAR CRIMiNALS 70 (1949).
184. Id. at 74-78.
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conspiracy to commit "crimes against peace" as prosecuted after the
Second World War or for engaging in a so-called "joint criminal
enterprise" to commit the "crime of aggression" under subparagraph (d)
of article 25(3) of the ICC Statute.
Consequently, subparagraphs (a) to (d) of article 25(3) of the ICC
Statute do not conflict with "crimes against peace." They can be directly
applied to the "crime of aggression" without departing in any way from
customary international law.
In relation to subparagraph (f) of article 25(3), it is evident that the ICC
will have to interpret on a case-by-case basis the meaning of taking action
that commences a crime's execution by means of a substantial step.
Nevertheless, the Barwirsch Case can serve as a precedent on which the
SWGCA can base itself if it chooses to criminalize the attempt to commit
the "crime of aggression." Barwirsch was for all intents and purposes
convicted for the planning and preparing of a "crime of aggression" even
though the collective act of aggression was never initiated or attempted.
The most progressive step the SWGCA can take is criminalizing the
direct and public incitement to commit aggression because there is no
judicial precedent to this effect. However, even this is not far detached
from the present state of international law, which prohibits propaganda for
aggressive war. This new international crime will have the direct
advantage of striking at the causes of aggression.
Furthermore, the SWGCA must not exclude an important component
of the "crime of aggression," namely, the policy level requirement. The
SWGCA has inadvertently touched upon this while discussing the crime's
so-called leadership nature. Its report states that there "was agreement that
the crime of aggression had the peculiar feature of being a leadership
crime, thereby excluding participants who could not influence the policy
of carrying out the crime, such as soldiers executing orders."' 85 There are
two reasons why it is essential that any mention of "leadership crime" be
replaced by the policy level requirement. First, the reference to the "policy
level" achieves the same objective as relying on "leadership crime" but
with more clarity and accuracy. The SWGCA's report indicates that the
view was expressed that more clarity was needed in regards to the meaning
of leadership as well as the scope of its application.' 86
Second, by limiting the "crime of aggression" to persons in "a position
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military

185. SWGCA Report, supra note 12,
186. Id. 29.
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action of the State,"' 8 7 the prosecutorial net is cast more narrowly than in
the cases from the Second World War to the possible exclusion for
instance of accomplices. 8 8 Also, this case law supports the reliance on the
policy level requirement and offers abundant information for the ICC in
defining the parameters of this notion. Judge Sir William Flood Webb,
Presiding Judge of the IMTFE, was the only one who contested the
existence of the policy level requirement with regard to "crimes against
peace." However, Judge Webb's findings appear superficial and
unconvincing and cannot be supported when compared to the extensive
case law analysis to the opposite effect cited above. A state that commits
aggression has the obligation to make reparations under the law of state
responsibility, but criminal prosecution should be reserved to that state's
policymakers that brought about the aggression.
Several participants of the SWGCA believed that article 25(3), as a
whole, was applicable to the "crime of aggression."' 89 The policy level
requirement of the "crime of aggression" should also apply accordingly.
Yet, "proposal A" contained in the SWGCA's report limited the policy
level requirement to subparagraphs (a) to (d) of article 25(3) of the ICC
Statute. There is no reason why it should not also expressly include the
crimes of attempt and incitement of aggression. 9 ° The discussion
undertaken above remains open regarding the obligation to strictly
construe the definition of any crime in the ICC Statute and not to extend
it by analogy.'91 It then follows that the approach taken in "proposal B,"
where the policy level requirement is inserted in article 25(3)(e) bis 9 2
without making express reference to the other subparagraphs of article
25(3), is not advisable.
It has been pointed out that in democratic society the application of the
policy level requirement of the "crime of aggression" would make it
difficult to differentiate between actual policymakers and mere

187. See Coordinator's Discussion Paper, supra note 9, § I, 1; see also SWGCA Report,
supra note 12, Annex I, Proposals A & B.
188. SWGCA Report, supranote 12, 22. Some participants ofthe SWGCA cautioned against
potentially excluding a given group of perpetrators.
189. Id. 21.
190. Id.Annex I, Proposal A. This is based on the assumption made earlier that the new article
25(3)(e) bis of the ICC Statute will criminalize the incitement of aggression and contain the policy
level requirement. Although not expressly stated by the Court in Barwirsch, it can be said that
Barwirsch acted on a policy level in relation to his attempted "crime of aggression." Moreover, the
application of the policy level requirement to the incitement of aggression is consistent with the
intention of the members of the SWGCA.
191. ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 22(2). See supra text accompanying notes 105-09.
192. SWGCA Report, supranote 12, Annex I, Proposal B.
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executioners because a large number of persons outside the Executive or
Parliament can be involved in the preparation and shaping of a political
93
decision such as journalists, members of think tanks and academics.
This does not mean that anyone directly or indirectly related to the
governmental apparatus can be prosecuted. For instance, some individuals
under a legal obligation to obey the order of their government can
potentially benefit from the defense of superior orders.' 94 This will likely
negate any assumption that they are on a policymaking level. Other
individuals on a policy level can invoke the various defenses provided for
in the ICC Statute, including the mistake of fact 9 5 and the right to selfdefense under article 51 of the U.N. Charter.'96 The policy level
requirement ensures that the "crime of aggression" serves as a deterrent
against waging illegal warfare. However, this is counter-balanced by the
knowledge and specific intent requirements of the crime. Finally, the
extent, or lack thereof, of an individual's involvement in the "crime of
aggression" shall be taken into consideration
by the ICC in determining
97
the appropriate sentence to be rendered.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Fernhndez de Gurmendi, supranote 4, at 598.
ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 33.
Id. art. 32.
Id. art. 31(3).
Id. art. 78.
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